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Morality, Simulacrum and Distraction: The Function of Art according 
to Rousseau 
 
 
João Gabriel Lima1 
 
 
 
Abstract: Jean-Jacques Rousseau was undoubtedly the first to investigate the ethical 
role of art in modern philosophical thought. However, his position was decidedly 
eccentric amidst the backdrop of the Enlightenment. According to Rousseau, Art was 
responsible for the destruction of virtue, but is responsible now for concocting a moral 
veneer. Art’s function is to construct this “moral veneer” that brings a stop to man’s 
turpitudes or, at least, reduces their occurrence. Art’s ethical benefit is not that it leads 
man to do good. Rather, the artistic simulacrum prevents the most hideous crimes from 
occurring. This paper investigates the ethical role of art in Rousseau's First Discourse 
and in the preface to his play Narcissus or the Self-Admirer. 
Keywords: art; ethics; Rousseau. 
 
Resumo: Jean-Jacques Rousseau foi, sem dúvida, o primeiro a investigar o papel ético 
da arte no pensamento filosófico moderno. Sua posição foi seguramente excêntrica no 
contexto do Iluminismo. De acordo com Rousseau, a arte foi responsável pela 
destruição da virtude, mas se tornou responsável por criar um “verniz moral”. A função 
ética da arte é construir esse “verniz moral” que põe a termo as torpezas humanas ou, ao 
menos, reduz a sua ocorrência. O benefício ético da arte não é, portanto, levar o homem 
ao bem. Ao contrário, o simulacro artístico apenas previne os mais terríveis crimes. Esse 
artigo investiga a função ética da arte no Primeiro Discurso de Rousseau e no prefácio a 
sua peça Narciso, ou o amante de si mesmo.  
Palavras-chave: arte; ética; Rousseau. 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 In Ancient Rome, each time senators felt suspicious about the morality of a 
novel proposition, they would to ask: Qui prodest? (Who benefits?). Indeed, if one is 
interested in discovering a thing’s true nature, it is quite useful to investigate not only its 
form or matter, but also its purpose. Inspired by the old politician's adage, our efforts 
today are concerned with the future, the aim, the final cause of a very strange subject. 
Art. Who reaps the benefits of a work of art? What is the real objective of literature, 
poetry, fiction, painting, sculpture and so on? What should art's goal be? Could we say 
that art has an ethical aim? Would we be better off with or without art? These were 
major questions for the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
                                                 
1
 Doutorando em Teoria Psicanalítica pela Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Endereço 
eletrônico: joaogabriellimadasilva@gmail.com. O presente artigo provém de um trabalho apresentado 
na Rousseau Tercentenary Conference (Colorado College), em dezembro de 2012.  O autor agradece a 
Brian Begnoche pela revisão do texto. 
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 In this paper, we will consider the function and purpose of art in two important 
works from Rousseau: the First Discourse and the preface to his play Narcissus or the 
Self-Admirer.  
 
 Rousseau's First Discourse 
 
 Rousseau's first composition on the function of art was the Discourse on the Arts 
and Sciences (better known as the First Discourse). The Dijon Academy proposed the 
following question as a matter for a brief dissertation: “Has the restoration of the 
sciences and the arts contributed to refining moral character?”2. The philosophers of 
Enlightenment often insisted on the value of science – especially against the authority of 
religion – and also on the educative3 (and sometimes moral4) role of art for the purposes 
of civilization. The question itself emerged from an institution dedicated to promoting, 
producing and diffusing scientific knowledge. However, Rousseau's answer to the 
question was an astonishing and resounding “σo”:  
 
Where there is no effect, no cause need be sought: but here the effect is 
certain, the depravation real, and our souls have become corrupted in 
proportion as our Sciences and our Arts have advanced toward perfection. [...] 
Virtue has been seen fleeing in proportion as their light rose on our horizon, 
and the same phenomenon has been observed at all times and in all places 
(Rousseau, 1997, p. 9, transl. V. Gourevitch).  
Où il n’y a nul effet, il n’y a point de cause à chercher: mais ici l’effet est 
certain, la dépravation réelle; et nos ames se sont corrompues à mesure que 
nos Sciences et nos Arts se sont avancés à la perfection. [...] On a vu la vertu 
s’enfuir à mesure que leur lumière s’élevoit sur notre horizon, et le même 
phénomène s’est observé dans tous les tems et dans tous les lieux (Rousseau, 
1852, p. 466).  
 
 Rousseau refused to acknowledge any intrinsic good in art or science. In fact, he 
argued the complete opposite, i.e., that both of them have contributed to the moral 
corruption of society. The philosopher witnessed firsthand how Parisians were affected 
by a luxurious life. But Rousseau went beyond his personal experience: he analyzed 
ancient cultures and observed an “unmistakable coincidence” between the rise of the 
arts and the decline of morality5. With the emergence of urban society, all sorts of 
concealment of virtue began to appear in the forms of politeness, aesthetic beauty, and 
luxury. The arts and sciences served not only to conceal and cloud the moral sense, but 
likewise served to expose, trivialize and stimulate immoral actions. The philosopher’s 
                                                 
2
 “Le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à épurer les mœurs?” (Rousseau, 18η2, p. 4θ3) 
3
 Cf. Ménil, 1995, p. 21-48. 
4
 Cf. Naves, 1967, p. 192-203. The morality of theater was a great issue for the philosophes:“Pour les 
philosophes, le théâtre devient la tribune de la tolérance […] Il conduira [François-Antoine] 
Chevrier à soutenir que le théâtre de Dancourt et celui de Piron sont d'une haute valeur morale” 
(Fuchs, 1946, p. XII-XIII); “Assim como Voltaire, Diderot atribui ao espetáculo um objetivo moral e 
pedagógico: assim como a filosofia combate os preconceitos, também o teatro deve esclarecer os 
homens, ensinando-os a amar a virtude e detestar o vício” (εatos, 2ίί9, p. 12); “ […] les 
représentations théatrales formeroient le goût des Citoyens, et leur donneroient une finesse de tact, 
une délicatesse de sentiment qu'il est très-difficile d'acquérir sans ce secours” (Diderot, 1ιιι, p. 9θ3). 
See also: Rousseau, 1948; Prado Jr., 1975. 
5
 Cf. Campbell & Scott, 2005.  
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criticisms were also aimed at the artist's unlimited desire for glory and applause6. 
According to Rousseau, artists are ambitious for public recognition (and, of course, for 
money); and, they will do everything possible to accommodate their public’s most 
sophisticated and perverse desires7.  
 To Rousseau’s mind, it would be improper to judge art’s contribution to society 
merely by the amount of pleasure or emotion it conjured in an individual, much less by 
the financial benefits it conferred upon the artist or by the flattering commentary it won 
him. Morality should have primacy over all artistic objects. Although we will not face 
the challenging task of defining Rousseau’s idea of “moral” in this paper8, it is useful to 
consider this central idea: that morality should be art's basic principle and end. Put 
otherwise, morality must determine art’s basic principles and only the moral effects of 
art amongst the public can justify art’s very existence.  
 For years, Rousseau’s critique of art was interpreted by critics in the most banal 
way. His philosophical opponents claimed that Rousseau desired the annihilation of the 
Arts and Sciences, leading mankind back to the age of primitive man. Nothing could be 
more terrifying to the Enlightenment, nor less consistent with Rousseau’s proposition. 
Rousseau spent a good part of his life trying to explain his critic’s errors regarding his 
work. In a passage from his autobiographical and critical writing Rousseau, Judge of 
Jean-Jacques, the philosopher exposes his true intentions for art:  
 
In his [i.e., Rousseau's] first writings it was necessary to destroy the illusion 
which fills us with an absurd admiration for the instruments of our 
unhappiness and to correct those false sets of values which heap honors upon 
pernicious talents and despise benevolent virtues. Everywhere he shows us 
humanity as better, [wiser], and happier in its original state, and as blind, 
unhappy, and evil to the degree that it has departed from that state […] But 
human nature does not turn back. Once mans has left it, he can never return to 
the time of innocence and equality. It was on this principle that he particularly 
insisted. […] He has been obstinately accused of wishing to destroy the 
sciences and the arts […] and to plunge humanity back into its original 
barbarism. Quite the contrary: he [Rousseau] always insisted on the 
preservation of existing institutions, maintaining that their destruction would 
leave the vices in existence and remove only the means to their cure, putting 
plunder in the place of corruption. (Rousseau apud CASSIRER, 1954, p. 54-
55. Transl. Peter Gay) 
Dans ses premiers écrits il s'attache davantage à détruire ce prestige 
d'illusion qui nous donne une admiration stupide pour les instruments de nos 
misères et à corriger cette estimation trompeuse qui nous fait honorer des 
talents pernicieux et mépriser des vertus utiles. Par tout il nous fait voir 
                                                 
6
 “Tout artiste veut être applaudi. Les éloges de ses contemporains sont la partie la plus précieuse de sa 
récompense. Que fera-t-il donc pour les obtenir, s'il a le malheur d'être né chez un peuple et dans des 
temps où les savants devenus à la mode ont mis une jeunesse frivole en état de donner le ton ; où les 
hommes ont sacrifié leur goût aux tyrans de leur liberté où l'un des sexes n'osant approuver que ce qui 
est proportionné à la pusillanimité de l'autre, on laisse tomber des chefs-d’œuvre de poésie 
dramatique, et des prodiges d'harmonie sont rebutés? Ce qu'il fera, messieurs ? Il rabaissera son 
génie au niveau de son siècle, et aimera mieux composer des ouvrages communs qu'on admire pendant 
sa vie que des merveilles qu'on n'admirerait que longtemps après sa mort”. (Rousseau, 1852, p. 474) 
7
 “Il y a mille prix pour les beaux discours, aucun pour les belles actions. Voilà ce qu’à la longue doit 
produire partout la préférence des talens agréables sur les talens utiles […]” (Rousseau, 1852, p. 
474). 
8
 Cf. Cassirer, 1954, p.91-106;  Schinz, 1929, p.138-150; Burns, 1996, p. 163-165; Ruzza, 2010; 
Lattman-Weltman, 1990. Mineau, 2007; Deluermoz, 2012; Melzer, 1995. 
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l’espèce humaine meilleure, plus sage et plus heureuse dans sa constitution 
primitive, aveugle, misérable et méchante à mesure qu'elle s'en éloigne. […] 
Mais la nature humaine ne rétrograde pas et jamais on ne remonte vers les 
temps d'innocence et d'égalité quand une fois on s'en est éloigné; c'est encore 
un des principes sur lesquels il a le plus insisté. […] On s'est obstiné à 
l'accuser de vouloir détruire les sciences, les Arts, les théâtres, les Académies 
et replonger l'univers dans sa première barbarie, et il a toujours insisté au 
contraire sur la conservation des institutions existantes, soutenant que leur 
destruction ne feroit qu'ôter les palliatifs en laissant les vices et substituer le 
brigandage à la corruption. (Rousseau, 1959, v. I, p. 934-935)  
 
 When we consider the elderly Rousseau looking back on the objective of his 
First Discourse, we can clearly understand the two faces of  a work of art according to 
him. On one hand, Art is the channel through which evil can spread its influence over 
the public. The First Discourse warns of this – a warning forgotten by the philosophes 
until that time. But on the other hand, Art is also a medium to attenuate the effects of 
vices in real life. Art stops moral corruption from transforming into evil actions.  (“le 
brigandage”, the unbridled violence). In short, Art has a potential to diminish unethical 
acts. This other side of artistic practice (i.e., the interruption of the immoral actions) 
received moderate exposure in another of Rousseau’s writings: in the preface of his play 
Narcissus: or the Self-Admirer.   
 
 Preface to Narcissus or the Self-Admirer 
 
 Rousseau wrote Narcissus when he was 18 years-old. It was not performed on 
stage until 20 years later, in 1752, when the Comédie Française decided to put on the 
play. At this time, the philosopher had already developed a good reputation throughout 
Paris. The success of his play can be measured by the statement of one of his 
contemporary critics: “the passion of Sir Rousseau is not to be applauded, but rather to 
be booed” (Fortes, 199ι, p. 1θ9). At the time of its publishing, Rousseau decided to 
write a brief preface in order to comment on some aspects of his “immature work”. At 
the end of this preface, Rousseau exposes some important new considerations on art's 
aim.  
 Again in the Preface, we see Rousseau’s distrust of artists. According to him, 
artists are not concerned with ethics: they solely consider public approval and their 
public image. A small minority of artists – merely the exception to the rule – overcomes 
this banal desire for society’s attention and manages to concentrate their efforts on real 
problems of morality and virtue9. Like Plato10, Rousseau, so it seems, would have liked 
                                                 
9
 “J’avoue qu’il y a quelques génies sublimes qui savent pénétrer à travers les voiles dont la vérité 
s’enveloppe ; quelques âmes privilégiées, capables des résister à la bêtise de la vanité, à la basse 
jalousie, et aux autres passions qu’engendre le goût des Lettres. Le petit nombre de ceux qui ont le 
bonheur de réunir ces qualités, est la lumière et l’honneur du genre-humain ; c’est à eux seuls qu’il 
convient pour le bien de tous de s’exercer à l’étude, et cette exception même confirme la règle”  
(Rousseau, 1964). 
10
 Questions regarding art are omnipresent in Plato's dialogues. The first important dialogue is the Ion, in 
which Socrates argues with a rhapsode who sings and explains Homeric poems. In this dialogue, the 
aim of Socrates is clearly not to deny the emotional impact that art engenders in the audience or even 
in the poet, but rather to reduce the pretentiousness of the poets and rhapsodes, who believed that 
poetry – and specially, Homer – gave them knowledge about life, war, love, virtue and all essential 
matters. Socrates understands the emotion imbedded in artistic manifestations as an “inspiration” or 
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to extend the requirement of ethical reflection to artists and men of culture as well. The 
triumph above narcissistic demands for glory and, moreover, the meditation on the 
moral impact of his work on the public are therefore the first ethical tasks that Rousseau 
presents to the artists.  
 Nonetheless, Rousseau presents a proposal in broader terms in the Preface. Not 
only do the Ciceros and Bacons welcome the moral purposes of Art, but mediocre 
playwrights and novelists do so as well11. Rousseau argues that although man has been 
corrupted throughout history under the influence of Art, this does not affect Art's current 
potential for ethical tasks. The following passage is essential in understanding Art's 
moral aims in the Preface: 
 
The same causes which have corrupted peoples sometimes serve to prevent a 
greater corruption […] and it is in this way that the arts and sciences, after 
having hatched the vices, are necessary for keeping them from turning into 
crimes; at least they cover them with a varnish which does not permit the 
poison to find a vent so freely. They destroy virtue, but leave its public 
simulacrum, which is always a fine thing. They introduce into its place 
politeness and the proprieties, and for the fear of appearing wicked they 
substitute that of being ridiculous. (Rousseau, 2007, p. 28. Transl. C. Kelly).  
[…] Les mêmes causes qui ont corrompu les peuples servent quelquefois à 
prévenir une plus grande corruption […] et c'est ainsi que les arts et les 
                                                                                                                                               
“divine dispensation” which the poet and the rhapsode feel while performing. But this “inspiration”, 
argues Socrates, has nothing to do with knowledge. As G. M. A. Grube (1973, p. 278) remarked, in the 
dialogue Ion, there is no contradictions between philosophy and art (or poetry). Both have their own 
intent: the former, to attain knowledge and reach the truth, the latter, perhaps, to inspire emotion in 
people. What remains especially important for Plato is that art is not able to reach any sort of 
knowledge or truth on its own. But Plato's main dialogue on arts is the famous book X of The 
Republic. Plato analyzes art by regarding its social value (Grube, 1973, p. 279). Being raised in 
Athens, Plato was instilled with a great respect for poets and artists through his upbringing, especially 
for traditional poets such as Homer. However, Plato sought to establish the conditions for a Republic 
in terms of true knowledge. Education was the essence of this project. In order to establish the 
philosopher as the guide of the State, once more he had to overlap the artist's ambition to serve as an 
ethical guide for the Greek people. Plato qualifies “imitation” or “personification” (μȓμȘıȚς) as the 
action realized by a poet or an artist at the creative or performative moment. But if the artist is an 
imitator, people also tends to personify (or imitate) the character's actions and thoughts after being 
affected by the emotive power of art. Moreover, instead of inciting the rational morality that controls 
passions (πάșİᾰ), poetry and tragedy speak directly to the audience's affects through a dangerous 
excitement of senses. In a work of art, the public entirely surrender to the feelings, putting aside the 
faculty of judgment. (Jaeger, 2003, p. 985). For these reasons, Plato believed that performers and 
authors should not have the freedom to choose the object and style of theirs arts, but that they should 
but imitate that which is appropriate to their vocation (Grube, 1973, p. 283). This conception of art 
might seem quite naïve if it would not been related to Plato's theory of Forms. His argument – very 
briefly summarized – is that real knowledge (ἐπȚıĲȒμȘ) could only be found in an abstract idea or 
form (İἶįος). In keeping with this theory, the ordinary artist has no true knowledge about anything, 
since he does little but imitate things of the sensible world (which are derived from the intelligible 
world, the world of essences). In the famous “third bed argument”, Plato states that a work of art is 
three times removed from truth. As in the Ion dialogue, there is no reason to suppose that poets and 
artists truly have knowledge about the essence of the things they imitate in their art. Plato expels the 
artist from his Republic on the grounds that “poetry ruins the spirit of those who hear it and who do 
not possess the remedy of the knowing the truth” (Jaeger, 2003, p. 982). However, he does so only to 
the ones that emotionalize people disorderly, without knowledge. But if ever existed an artist who 
truly conquered true knowledge, an artist that were also a philosopher, Plato would be more than 
willing to open the gates of The Republic to such a man. (Grube, 1973, p. 290). 
11
 Cf. Rousseau, 2005, p. 38. 
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sciences après avoir fait éclore les vices, sont nécessaires pour les empêcher 
de se tourner en crimes ; elles les couvrent au moins d'un vernis qui ne permet 
pas au poison de s'exhaler aussi librement. Elles détruisent la vertu, mais 
elles en laissent le simulacre public qui est toujours une belle chose. 
(Rousseau, 1964, p. 972).  
 
  Having once been responsible for the destruction of virtue, we see here that Art 
has now been transformed into an artificial – but efficient instrument that now serves 
moral aims. In other terms, though Art is unable to develop one's moral sense, it can at 
least maintain some secondary moral purpose, leaving a “public simulacrum”. In order 
to clarify the meaning of the term “simulacrum”, Rousseau proposes a definition in a 
likewise important footnote:  
 
This simulacrum is a certain gentleness of morals that sometimes replaces 
their pourity, a certain appearance of order that prevents horrible confusion, a 
certain admiration of beatiful things that keeps the good ones from falling 
completely into obscurity. It is vice that takes the mask of virtue, not as 
hypocrisy in order to deceive and betray, but under this lovable and sacred 
effigy to escape from the horror that ir has of itself when it sees itself 
uncovered.  (Rousseau, 2007, p. 29. Transl. C. Kelly). 
Ce simulacre est une certaine douceur de mœurs qui supplée quelquefois à 
leur pureté, une certaine apparence d’ordre qui prévient l’horrible confusion, 
une certaine admiration des belles choses qui empêche les bonnes de tomber 
tout-à-fait dans l’oubli. C’est le vice qui prend le masque de la vertu, non 
comme l’hypocrisie pour tromper et trahir, mais pour s’ôter sous cette 
aimable et sacrée effigie l’horreur qu’il a de lui-même quand il se voit à 
découvert (Rousseau, 1964, p. 972).  
 Art, then, is responsible for bequeathing the simulacrum, which is clearly not 
moral in itself, but is rather the “appearance of order”, the “taste of moral” and “the 
admiration of beautiful things”. Following Rousseau, the simulacrum impedes the 
“forgetting” of “good things” and prevents a terrible disorder that would perhaps spread 
in art’s absence. In this sense, Rousseau's idea of a “public simulacrum” seems to be the 
very exercise of maintaining the few superficial aspects of morality that our culture has 
not yet discarded.  
 But how is it possible to keep such semblances of moral? The philosopher Victor 
Goldschmidt argues that, to Rousseau, Art can benefit morality since it “permits […] an 
action of postponement (retardement) over the corruption”12. However, the efficacy of 
this “medicine”, reminds Goldschmidt, depends on the artist, which “doit empêcher le 
“simulacre” de tourner en “hypocrisie” et conserver au vice […] sa mauvaise 
conscience” (Goldschmidt, 1987, p. 81-82). As long as the Arts, Sciences and 
Humanities were capable of maintaining the simulacrum (without being hypocritical), 
their moral existence remained justified as a “remedy for the evil that they have caused” 
(Rousseau, 1964, p. 972). Thus, Rousseau's argument is that Art is a palliative medicine 
that postpones the realization of turpitude, not through the example of virtue itself but 
through the “simulacrum”.  
 Rousseau also suggests that Art is able to serve virtue since it acts as a moral 
varnish13. Art has now a secondary purpose, or, a moral minimum, which consists 
                                                 
12
 “[...] permet […] une action de retardement sur la corruption” (Goldschmidt, 1987, p. 81). 
13
  “[...]  elles les couvrent au moins d'un vernis qui ne permet pas au poison de s'exhaler aussi 
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specifically of impeding the practice of heinous crimes14. The moral function of art 
would compensate therefore by preventing evil from taking form as a physical act – an 
unruly violent act in its ultimate form (“le brigandage”15). Art has then the moral 
responsibility to prevent crimes in the real world. The “public simulacrum” in Art serves 
as a moral varnish that does not allow evil to present itself in any other way but through 
art. If art has managed to contribute this to society, no matter how modestly, its use will 
have certainly been moral, ethical. Or rather: if art must bring moral disgrace to society; 
at least it can help us resist the slide towards immoral acts and criminal activity.   
  Rousseau remains convinced that the art of his time was unable to change a 
citizen’s moral judgment16. However, the philosopher did observe that Art serves to 
distract people for a given period of time. According to him, that “distraction” fulfills a 
moral function. Rousseau exposes his ideal of distraction in this passage:  
 
 
It is no longer an issue of bringing people to do good: it is only necessary to 
distract them from doing evil; it is necessary to occupy them with foolishness 
to turn them away from bad actions; it is necessary to amuse them instead of 
preaching to them. If my Writings have edified the small number of good 
people, i have done them all the good that depends on me, and it is perhaps 
still to serve them usefully to offer objects of distraction to the others which 
will keep them from thinking about them. I would consider myself only too 
happy to have a Play to be hissed each day, if at this cost I could keep in 
check the bad plans of a single one of the Spectators […] (Rousseau, 2ίίι, p. 
30. Transl. C. Kelly). 
Il ne s’agit plus de porter les peuples à bien faire, il faut seulement les 
distraire de faire le mal; il faut les occuper à des niaiseries pour les détourner 
des mauvaises actions; il faut les amuser au lieu de les prêcher. Si mes Ecrits 
ont édifie le petit nombre des bons, je leur ai fait tout le bien qui dependoit de 
moi, et c’est peut-être les servir utilement encore que d’offrir aux autres des 
objets de distraction qui les empêchent de songer à eux. Je m’estimerois trop 
heureux d’avoir tous les jours une Piece à faire siffler, si je pouvois à ce prix 
contenir pendant deux heures les mauvais desseins d’un seul des Spectateurs 
[...](Rousseau, 1964, p. 972-973).  
  
 Firstly, the idea of distraction to Rousseau means a “recreation” or “pastime”. 
People have to actually spend some time enjoying art, otherwise it is not a distraction. 
The distraction is therefore the Art's capacity to absorb one's mind for some time with a 
pleasurable experience. However, distraction is also related to the idea of deviating. 
“They must be occupied with silly trifles”, argues Rousseau, “in order to steer them 
away from pernicious actions” (Rousseau, 2ί11). He further states: “It is no longer a 
matter of bringing people to do good, but only of distracting them from doing evil” 
(Rousseau, 2011). It becomes ever more clear that Art is nothing more than a distraction  
–  “a detour” – from an “immoral path”. This immoral path signifies not only the 
possibility of desiring something immoral, but more importantly, it represents the 
impetus to repeatedly commit immoral acts. Rousseau realized that Art is incapable of 
                                                                                                                                               
librement" (Rousseau, 1964, p. 972). 
14
 “C'est ainsi que les arts et les sciences après avoir fait éclore les vices, sont nécessaires pour les 
empêcher de se tourner en crimes” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 972). 
15
 Cf. Rousseau, 1959, v. I, p. 934-935. 
16
 Cf. Letter to D'Alembert. (Rousseau, 1948).  
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eradicating man’s immoral desires. But, at the very least, it could serve as a way to 
impede those desires from coming to fruition via immoral acts.  
 As Rousseau seems to support in the Preface, all the evil contained in works of 
art is justified if it can keep someone from enacting immoral deeds. Although displaying 
scenes of immorality, Art obstructs and delays the drive to realize immoral actions, 
impelling the individual to follow more and more the artistic deviation. But Rousseau is 
very aware of the fact that Art is often hypocritical17. Instead of reducing audience's 
impulse to commit evil actions, Art sometimes excites audience's desires to practice 
immorality. Every work of art that incites immoral desires amidst an atmosphere of light 
diversion is hypocritical in relation to what should be its actual function, according to 
Rousseau – which is to reduce people's drive to commit evil acts. The function of Art is 
therefore to permanently block the path of immoral acts, offering a diversion, a 
distraction which would guide the “passenger” to his destination, but through a longer, 
recreational and ever-changing route. In other terms, Art means the very possibility to 
indulge immoral pleasures, but without actually committing immoral acts. Nevertheless, 
in order to accomplish its ethical task, Art must also reinforce the simulacrum, reinforce 
the sense that the possibility to act immorally is obstructed. In short, a true, a non-
hypocritical Art is one that transforms evil into artistic matter while hindering the 
audience's desires to commit immoral acts.  
 
 Conclusion 
 
 It would be disingenuous to believe that Rousseau remained satisfied with this 
“secondary moral” for the sake of achieving his desired “authentic and true human 
community” (Cassirer, 19η4, p. ηη). But instead of immediately expelling the second-
rate artists from the State, as Plato did, Rousseau admits that even the “immoral Art” of 
his (and our) times has the side effect of morality. Rousseau holds that this precarious – 
but vital – side effect justifies the prescription of this medicine, at least until humankind 
is prepared for a revolutionary change in Art's conception. When this happens, Art will 
be relieved of this secondary task of distracting man from doing evil, assuming its 
primary function: the very expression of freedom.  
 
 References 
 
 BEσERJEE, Amal. “Rousseau's concept of theater”. In: British Journal of Aesthetics, n. 
17 v. 2,  1977.  
 CASSIRER, Ernst. The question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1954. 
______. La philophie des lumières. Paris: Fayard, 1970.  
CAεPBEδ, S. H.; SCτTT, J. T. “Rousseau's Politic Argument in the Discourse on the 
Sciences and Arts”. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 4. Oct., 2005. 
DELON, Michel (org.). Dictionnaire européen des Lumières. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2007  
DELUERMOZ, Frédéric. La morale de Rousseau, 2012. Available in: 
http://rousseaustudies.free.fr 
DENT, N. J. H. Dicionário Rousseau. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 1996. 
                                                 
17
  “C’est le vice qui prend le masque de la vertu, non comme l’hypocrisie pour tromper et trahir, mais 
pour s’ôter sous cette aimable et sacrée effigie l’horreur qu’il a de lui-même quand il se voit à 
découvert” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 972).  
 81 
 
A
rt
ef
ilo
so
fia
,
 
O
u
ro
 P
re
to
, 
n
.1
5,
 d
ez
em
br
o
 
20
13
 
FAÇAσHA, δuciano da Silva. “Imitação e imaginação, da mímese às paixões: a ilusão 
do reflexo para Rousseau”. In: Anais do VII Encontro Humanístico. São Luís: Edufma, 2008 
FORTES, Luiz Roberto Salinas. Paradoxo do espetáculo: política e poética em 
Rousseau. São Paulo: Discurso, 1997  
FUCHS, ε. “Introduction”. In: RτUSSEAU, J-J. Lettre à Mr. D'Alembert sur les 
spectacles. Lille: Librarie Giard, 1948.  
 GOLDSCHMIDT, Victor. Anthropologie et politique: Les principes du système de 
Rousseau. Paris: Vrin, 1983.  
 GτUREVITCH, Victor. 19ι2. “Rousseau on the Arts and Sciences”. Journal of 
Philosophy 69:20, 1972. 
GRUBE, G. M. A. El pensamiento de Platón. Madrid: Gredos, 1973.  
GONÇALVES, εarcos Fernandes. “A concepção do espetáculo como supérfluo”. 
Synesis, v. 3, n. 1, 2011.  
JAEGER,Werner. Paidéia: a formação do homem grego. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 
2003.  
KIT, Li Ying. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Critique of the Arts (Dissertation). Hong Kong: 
The University of Hong Kong, 2005.  
LATTMAN-WELTMAN, Fernando. Ética e politica: uma leitura de Rousseau e Kant. 
Rio de Janeiro: Iuperj, 1990. 
εATτS, Franklin de. “A querela do teatro no século XVIII: Voltaire, Diderot, 
Rousseau”. In: O que nos faz pensar, n. 25, 2009.  
εEδZER, Arthur ε. “Rousseau and the εodern Cult of Sincerity”. The Harvard 
Review of Philosophy, 1995 (Spring).  
MÉNIL, Alain. Diderot et le drame. Paris: PUF, 1995. 
εIσEAU, Caroline δ. “δa signification morale du projet de sincérité de Rousseau”. In: 
Revue Phares, Volume 7, 2007.  
MORTIER, Roland. Les Combats des lumières: recueil d'études sur le dix-huitième 
siècle. Centre international d'étude du dix-huitième siècle, 2000.  
 σASCIεEσTτ, εilton εeira do. “Rousseau: da servidão à liberdade”. In: WEFFτRT, 
F. C. (org.) Clássicos da política 1. São Paulo: Ática, 2006.  
NAVES, Raymond. Le goût de Voltaire. Genève: Slaktine Reprints, 1967.  
PLATON. Oeuvres Complètes. Paris: Flammarion, 2008. 
 PRADτ JR., Bento. “Gênese e estrutura dos espetáculos (nota sobre a δettre à 
d'Alembert, de Jean-Jacques Rousseau)”. In: Estudos Cebrap n. 14, 1975. 
 ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques. Discurso sobre a origem e os fundamentos da desigualdade 
entre os homens (precedido de Discurso sobre as ciências e as artes). São Paulo: Martins 
Fontes, 2005.  
 ______. Carta a Cristophe de Beaumont e outros escritos sobre a religião e a moral. São 
Paulo: Estação Liberdade, 2005b.  
 ______. Preface to “Narcissus, or the Lover of Himself” (translated by Samuel Webb). 
2011.  Available in: 
www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/rousseau/narcissus/preface.htm 
 ______. Oeuvres complètes de J.J. Rousseau: avec des notes historiques. Paris: A. 
Houssiaux, 1852  
 ______. The discourses and other political writings. Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 1997.  
 ______. Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1. Paris: Gallimard, 1959.  
 ______. Oeuvres complètes, vol. 3. Paris: Gallimard, 1964. 
 ______. Rousseau: On Philosophy, Morality and Religion. (Ed. Cristopher Kelly). 
Lebanon: DCP, 2007.  
 ______. Social Contract & Discourses (translated with Introduction by G. D. H. Cole). 
New York: E. P. Dutton & Co, 1920. 
RUZZA, Antonio. Rousseau e a moralidade republicana no contrato social. São Paulo: 
 82 
 
A
rt
ef
ilo
so
fia
,
 
O
u
ro
 P
re
to
, 
n
.1
5,
 d
ez
em
br
o
 
20
13
 
Annablume, 2010. 
 SCHINZ, Albert. La pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 
1929.  
 STAROBINSKY, Jean. Jean-Jacques Rousseu: a transparência e o obstáculo –  Sete 
ensaios sobre Rousseau. Sao Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2011.  
 TODOROV, Tzvetan. O Espírito das Luzes. São Paulo: Barcarolla, 2008.  
 VAZ, Anelise. “A igualdade pensada e a igualdade possível: reflexões sobre o conceito 
de igualdade em Hobbes, Locke e Rousseau e considerações sobre sua aplicabilidade”. In: 
Revista Iluminart do IFSP, n. 4, v. 1, 2010.  
 VOLTAIRE, F. M. A. de. Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire: Mélanges, vol. 19. Paris, 
Hachette, 1860. 
